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Abstract
This Article examines the operation of the European Convention on the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms system (”European Convention on Human Rights” or “Convention”) (i.e., the Council of Europe’s system for human rights protection, based on the European
Convention on Human Rights and the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, as
distinct from the unique system of the European Union). The system is examined in an effort
to discern the enhanced impact the Convention may have on Community law under the Lisbon
Treaty, and the difficulties this may present.

THE INFLUENCE OF THE EUROPEAN
CONVENTION ON FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS ON
COMMUNITY LAW
Hon. Mr. Justice John L. Murray
INTRODUCTION
As a consequence of World War II, Europe suffered not only
material but moral devastation. Its post-war leaders, aghast at
what had occurred, sought to establish structures that would act
as ramparts against future degradation of human dignity and
human rights. At the national level, constitutional courts were
established to enforce new constitutional protections for such
rights, particularly from arbitrary state activities.1
At the international level, the European Convention on the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
(“European Convention on Human Rights” or “Convention”)
came into force in 1953.2 The contracting states undertook to
respect and observe the rights guaranteed in the Convention.
Those states were answerable to supervisory organs3 based in
Strasbourg, conferred with the jurisdiction to interpret the
Convention and to determine cases brought before them where a
* Chief Justice of Ireland. Member of the Court of Justice of the European
Communities 1991–99. The Author wishes to acknowledge the valuable assistance of
Tom Daly, Executive Legal Officer to the Chief Justice, in the preparation of this Article.
1. Ireland and Austria were the only two Western European countries which had,
prior to the Second World War, courts empowered to judicially review state action and
in particular legislation. See MAURO CAPPELLETTI, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE
CONTEMPORARY WORLD 46–47, 46 n.5 (1971).
2. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter European Convention on Human Rights]
(entered into force Sept. 3, 1953).
3. The two part-time supervisory organs—the European Commission of Human
Rights (“Commission”) and the European Court of Human Rights—were replaced by a
full-time European Court of Human Rights in 1998, following adoption of the Eleventh
Protocol to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms. See Protocol No. 11 to the Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Restructuring the Control Machinery
Established Thereby art. 1, May 11, 1994, 2061 A-2889 U.N.T.S. 7 [hereinafter
Convention Protocol 11].
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contracting state had breached its provisions. More or less
parallel with this development, steps were taken to establish the
European Communities (“Community”), the precursors of the
now denominated European Union (“EU”), with a view toward
closer union, particularly in the economic and social fields, of the
peoples of (Western) Europe.
If the post-war movement for the judicial protection of
human rights enjoyed concrete success, it apparently escaped the
attention of key players such as Jean Monnet in the construction
of the treaties, particularly the Treaty of Rome,4 from which the
European Communities blossomed into its present state as the
European Union. For example, no reference was made to the
protection of fundamental human rights in the founding treaties,
and the Court of Justice of the European Communities (“Court
of Justice”),5 in interpreting and applying the treaties, initially
considered itself without power to judicially review Community
measures with regard to their compatibility with fundamental
human rights.
The idea that the Treaty of Rome implicitly conferred
jurisdiction on the Court of Justice to review Community
measures and actions for their compatibility with respect for
fundamental human rights had a difficult but successful birth in
the Internationale Handelsgesellschaft6 and Nold7 cases, a story that is
well documented in legal literature. This development was
nurtured and developed in subsequent case law. The recognition
by the Court of Justice of the European Communities that
fundamental rights and their protection were integral parts of
the system of law of the European Communities, and now the
EU, was hailed as adding a legitimacy to the rule of law in the EU
which had been absent, reducing the democratic deficit that

4. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter EEC Treaty].
5. It may be noted that, following enactment of the Lisbon Treaty, the court system
of the European Union (“EU”) is now known as the Court of Justice of the European
Union. It comprises three courts: the Court of Justice; the General Court (formerly the
Court of First Instance); and the Civil Service Tribunal. In this Article, references to the
“Court of Justice” are to that Court, unless otherwise indicated.
6. Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr-und Vorratsstelle für
Getreide und Futtermittel, Case 11/70, [1970] E.C.R. 1125, ¶¶ 3–4.
7. Nold v. Commission, Case 4/73, [1974] E.C.R. 491, ¶ 13.
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existed in its legal framework, and as being a major step in the
constitutionalization of the treaties as a whole.8
Since those early days, the formal or textual basis in the
treaties for the protection of human rights has advanced
considerably, often by the member states of the EU playing catchup on the case law of the Court of Justice by inscribing formally
in the treaties (for example, the Treaties of Amsterdam and
Maastricht) the legal or constitutional basis for the protection of
human rights within the sphere of EU law as already established
in the court’s case law.
While the Convention, as an international convention to
which the member states of the EU are contracting parties (along
with twenty other non-EU states), has long served as a source of
inspiration, in the comparative law sense, for decisions of the
Court of Justice in the field of human rights, that Convention is
now, by virtue of the Lisbon Treaty,9 fairly firmly absorbed as part
of the internal rubric of law of the European Union and due to
be fully so when the European Union itself becomes a signatory
to the Convention as the Lisbon Treaty mandates.
This might be said to be the culmination of the evolution
and development of human rights protection in the vast areas of
government now occupied and ruled by EU law, including justice
and security affairs. As a result, the jurisprudence of the
European Court of Human Rights is destined to play a dominant
role in the interpretation and protection of fundamental human
rights in the legal order of the EU.
It is ironic that this major step should give rise in many
quarters once again to fears concerning the future legitimacy of
trans-European judicial decisions governing sensitive, social,
ethical, and political issues in the member states of the EU.
Accordingly, it appears a worthwhile exercise to examine the
operation of the Convention system (i.e., the Council of Europe’s
system for human rights protection, based on the European
Convention on Human Rights and the jurisprudence of the
European Court of Human Rights, as distinct from the unique
system of the EU) in an effort to discern the enhanced impact
8. Id.
9. Having been ratified by all member states of the European Union, the Lisbon
Treaty entered into force on December 1, 2009. The Treaty of Lisbon, Dec. 13, 2007,
2007 O.J. C 306/1 [hereinafter Reform Treaty] (entered into force Dec. 1, 2009).
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the Convention may have on Community law under the new
treaty, and the difficulties this may present.
I.

EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

The Convention sets out a substantial catalog of civil and
political rights10 and forms the heart of a pan-European regime
of human rights protection to which all member states of the
sixty-year-old Council of Europe are parties. It is worthwhile to
briefly contrast the nature of the convention system with that of
the European Union, as they differ fundamentally in both nature
and membership.
The primary aim of the EU is to further economic, social,
and political integration among its member states. It is a sui
generis autonomous legal system with law-making powers vested in
its institutions, to which its member states have consciously
transferred a significant proportion of their sovereign
governmental powers. EU law is characterized by the principles
of direct effect and primacy of Community law in relation to
national law, and thus forms an integral part of national law in
each member state, which is relied upon and enforced by
national courts. Thus, EU law and the decisions of the Court of
Justice may be relied upon by individuals before national courts
in all Member States. The ability to do so applies in a uniform
manner in all Member States and is not dependant on, or
governed by, national legislation. Reflecting the high degree of
integration at the EU level, the decisions of the Court of Justice
have a direct impact on domestic legal systems as they are
binding erga omnes, and strong mechanisms exist for their
enforcement.11
10. See generally European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 2, arts. 2–3, 5–
6, 8–10 (guaranteeing the right to life, the prohibition of torture, the right to personal
liberty and security, the right to a fair trial, the right to respect for private and family life,
freedom of thought, conscience and religion, freedom of expression, and freedom of
assembly and association). Other rights, such as the right to property and the right to
education, are guaranteed by additional protocols to the convention. See Protocol to the
Convention of the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms arts. 1, 2,
Mar. 20, 1952, 213 U.N.T.S. 262 [hereinafter Convention Protocol 1].
11. National courts at all levels will apply and enforce EU law, including decisions
of the Court of Justice, as part of domestic law, and individuals may obtain damages
against governments should direct loss be sustained as a result of a clear failure to
ensure that there are legal measures in place to protect all legal rights under EU law
(economic, social and so forth). In addition, the European Commission can bring
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By contrast, the objective of the Council of Europe is to
develop and protect common democratic principles throughout
Europe, such as the rule of law and respect for human rights,
based primarily on the European Convention on Human
Rights.12 While it is a highly developed system for human rights
protection that allows individual petitions to be brought against
states for violation of Convention rights, it is also an
intergovernmental organization that remains anchored in the
realm of international law and operates within its limits.
Elaboration of the rights enshrined in the European
Convention on Human Rights is the responsibility of the
European Court of Human Rights, which sits in Strasbourg
(“Strasbourg Court”). Unlike the EU’s Court of Justice, which
ensures the uniform application of the entire corpus of
Community law in each of the EU member states, the Strasbourg
Court focuses exclusively on interpretation of the Convention.
Unlike judgments of the Court of Justice, the decisions of the
Strasbourg Court are binding only on the state to which they are
addressed and there is no strong or uniform enforcement
mechanism,13 although, in practice, it is rare that a state fails to
comply with a decision of the court. The Convention cannot be
directly invoked before national courts in the same manner as
EU law and decisions of the Court of Justice. While many
countries have made the Convention directly applicable in their
legal systems, others have made it applicable to a much more
limited extent. Thus, the Convention can be relied upon by
individuals before national courts only to the extent provided by
national law. Otherwise, they are left to seeking a remedy before
infringement proceedings against member states for failure to comply with their
obligations under Community law, and the Court of Justice has the power to fine
member states for failing to comply with the court’s decisions.
12. Other Council of Europe instruments for the protection of individual rights
include the European Social Charter, Oct. 18, 1961, Europ. T.S. No. 35; the European
Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Nov. 26, 1987, Europ. T.S. No. 126, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 1152; and the
European Convention on Extradition, Dec. 13, 1957, Europ. T.S. No. 24.
13. As the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany has observed, there is no
“schematic way” of enforcing decisions of the European Court of Human Rights. See
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], Oct. 14, 2004,
docket no. 2 BvR 1481/04, 111 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts
[BVerfGE] 307 (323); see also Clemens Rieder, Protecting Human Rights within the
European Union: Who is Best Qualified to Do the Job—the European Court of Justice or the
European Court of Human Rights?, 20 TUL. EUR. & CIV. L.F. 73, 100 (2005).
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the European Court of Human Rights by bringing separate
proceedings against their government.
Given its continent-wide membership of forty-seven states,
stretching from Iceland in the west to Azerbaijan in the east,
there is a much greater level of political and cultural diversity
among the member states of the Council of Europe than exists
within the twenty-seven member EU itself.
All twenty-seven member states of the EU are contracting
parties to the Convention, as this is a condition of EU
membership.14 However, the EU itself is not yet a contracting
party to the Convention, and thus Community law measures are
not yet subject to review by the Strasbourg Court. The Lisbon
Treaty now requires the EU to accede to the Convention, which
is discussed more fully in Part III.
II. THE INFLUENCE OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON
COMMUNITY LAW TO DATE
Until the 1970s, the Convention and European Community
systems operated on parallel tracks: the organs of the Convention
system were the sole arbiters of fundamental rights on the
European stage,15 while the European Communities focused on
the construction of a common market. For a variety of reasons,16
the founding treaties of the European Communities initially
contained no reference to fundamental rights (apart from the
14. Conditions for membership of the EU, known as the “Copenhagen criteria,”
were set out by the European Council in Copenhagen in 1993 and added to by the
Madrid European Council in December 1995. See Cophenhagen European Council,
Presidency Conclusions, E.U. BULL., no. 6, at 7 (1993); Madrid European Council,
Conclusions of the Presidency, E.U. BULL., no. 12, at 9 (1995).
15. The Convention system originally contained two part-time organs which were
replaced by the current, full-time European Court of Human Rights with the entry into
force of Protocol 11 to the European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms on November 1, 1998. See supra note 3 and accompanying
text.
16. First, at the establishment of the European Communities the Convention had
already come into force and was to provide the basis for the protection of human rights
and fundamental freedoms across Europe. Second, there was a widely-held belief that
the process of economic integration envisaged by the Community treaties could not lead
to a violation of human rights. Third was the fear of the original Member States that
including a “Bill of Rights” in the EC Treaty would facilitate an unwelcome expansion of
Community powers, in leading the institutions of the then-European Economic
Community to interpret their competences as constituting anything not explicitly
prohibited by the enumerated guarantees therein.
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four freedoms and the prohibition of discrimination)17 and the
Court of Justice evinced considerable reluctance to tread into
this area.18
However, faced with the possibility of member states’
constitutional courts reviewing the compatibility of Community
law with national constitutional rights prior to its
implementation, which would greatly undermine the uniform
application of Community law, the Court of Justice recognized in
Internationale Handelsgesellschaft,19 in 1970, and Nold,20 in 1974,
that respect for fundamental rights forms an integral part of the
general principles of Community law. The court was to protect
the fundamental rights within the sphere of Community law
according to an unwritten catalogue of rights inspired by the
constitutional traditions of the member states and the guidelines
supplied by international human rights treaties on which the
member states had collaborated or to which they were parties.
The choice of these sources being those to which the member
states were inextricably linked was designed to give legitimacy to
the court’s decisions on issues as sensitive as those relating to
human rights.
In practice, the Court of Justice’s reference to national
constitutions as a source of rights has been sporadic, and while
reference has been made to other rights instruments, such as
those of the United Nations or the International Labor
Organization, the European Convention on Human Rights has
provided the only clear point of agreement as to a whole raft of
rights commonly recognized by all EU member states.
Since the mid-1990s in particular, the Court of Justice has
increasingly looked to the European Convention on Human
Rights for inspiration as to the nature and scope, or even
existence, of fundamental rights in Community law, having

17. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community
art. 12, 2006 O.J. C 321 E/37, at 15 [hereinafter EC Treaty]. The four freedoms refer to
the free movement of goods, capital, services, and people, as guaranteed by Community
law. See EEC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 3.
18. See, e.g., Stork v. High Authority, Case 1/58, [1959] E.C.R. 43.
19. Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr-und Vorratsstelle für
Getreide und Futtermittel, Case 11/70, [1970] E.C.R. 1125, ¶ 4.
20. Nold v. Commission, Case 4/73, [1974] E.C.R. 491, ¶ 2.
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recognized the preeminent position of the Convention by 1991.21
In doing so, the Court of Justice has adopted a somewhat
deferential position to the Strasbourg Court in the interpretation
of fundamental rights that are contained in the Convention.22
A clear example of such deference is the Court of Justice’s
case law on searches of business premises. In a 1989 judgment,
Hoechst AG v. Commission,23 the Court of Justice held that business
premises were not protected by article 8 of the Convention
guaranteeing the inviolability of the home. However, it revised its
position in the 2002 decision of Roquettes Frères SA v. Commission,24
in light of an intervening decision of the European Court of
Human Rights,25 in which the Strasbourg Court held that
business premises did come within the protection of article 8 of
the Convention.26
The Court of Justice has also demonstrated an increasing
willingness to review legislation in light of Convention standards,
which is demonstrated most clearly in family reunification cases.
In Demirel v. Stadt Schwäbisch Gmünd,27 a 1987 decision
concerning the reunification of a Turkish national with his
family, the Court of Justice evinced considerable reluctance to
engage with fundamental rights arguments based on the
Convention on the basis that it had “no power to examine the
compatibility with the European Convention on Human Rights
of national legislation lying outside the scope of Community law”
in the absence of Community regulations specifically concerning
family reunification for Turkish workers residing in the
Community.28

21. See, e.g., Elliniki Radiophonia Tiléorassi AE v. Dimotiki Etairia Pliroforissis, Case
C-260/89, [1990] E.C.R. I-2925, ¶ 41.
22. This is not to say that the Court of Justice has interpreted fundamental rights at
all times in line with the European Court of Human Rights; there are certainly cases of
divergence but these are, on the whole, infrequent. See, e.g., Frederic van den Berghe,
The EU and Issues of Human Rights Protection: Same Solutions to More Acute Problems?, 16
EUR. L.J. 112, 119–22 (2010).
23. Hoechst AG v. Commission, Joined Cases 46/87 & 227/88, [1989] E.C.R. 2859,
¶ 18.
24. Roquette Frères SA v. Directeur-Général de la Concurrence, de la
Consommation et de la Répression des Fraudes, Case 94/00, [2001] E.C.R. I-11.
25. See Société Colas Est v. France, 2002-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 133 (2002).
26. Roquette, [2001] E.C.R. I-11, ¶ 29.
27. Demirel v. Stadt Schwäbisch Gmünd, Case 12/86, [1987] E.C.R. 3719.
28. Id. ¶ 28.
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However, later decisions of the Court of Justice display a
lesser degree of caution. Most notably, in its 2003 decision in
Secretary of State for the Home Dep’t v. Akrich,29 the Court of Justice
instructed a British court that it was required to have regard for a
spouse’s right to respect her family life guaranteed by article 8 of
the Convention in assessing the application of her husband, a
Moroccan (and therefore non-EU) national, to remain in Britain,
provided the marriage was genuine.30 The Akrich decision has
been viewed as a virtually direct application of article 8 of the
Convention by the Court of Justice, rather than the use of article
8 as an interpretive guide: the court held that the provision is a
general principle of Community law, set out the Strasbourg
Court’s test for review of restrictions on that right, and stipulated
that the national court was bound to uphold the right as
interpreted by the Strasbourg Court.31 The decision has also been
characterized as a sign that even matters that appear prima facie as
purely internal to a member state (e.g., immigration) may be
subject to review by the Court of Justice;32 in essence, as one
commentator put it, the United Kingdom’s wish to exclude Mr.
Akrich from its territory was “thwarted” by article 8 of the
Convention applied via Community law.33
The special position accorded to the Convention in
Community law by the Court of Justice has been enshrined in
successive treaties,34 which have formally endorsed the approach
taken by the Court of Justice in its case law. Article 6(2) of the
Maastricht Treaty of 1992, as amended by the Amsterdam Treaty
of 1997, provides that “the Union shall respect fundamental
rights, as guaranteed by [the European Convention on Human
29. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t v. Akrich, Case C-109/01, [2003] E.C.R. I9607.
30. Id. ¶¶ 59, 61.
31. See id. ¶¶ 59–61.
32. See Xavier Groussot, UK Immigration Law Under Attack and the Direct Application of
Article 8 ECHR by the ECJ, 3 NON-ST. ACTORS & INT’L L. 187, 200 (2003).
33. Carole Lyons, Human Rights Case Law of the European Court of Justice, January
2003 to October 2003, 3 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 323, 330 (2003).
34. See Single European Act pmbl., 1987 O.J. L 169/1, at 2, corrected by 1987 O.J.
L 304/46 (amending the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community,
March 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11) (stating that the member states are, “[d]etermined to
work together to promote democracy on the basis of the fundamental rights recognized
in the constitutions and laws of the member states, in the [Convention] and the
European Social Charter, notably freedom, equality and social justice.”); see also infra
Part III (discussing the fundamental rights provisions of the Lisbon Treaty).
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Rights] and as they result from the constitutional traditions
common to the Member States, as general principles of
Community law.”35
The evolution has therefore generally been in one direction:
the status of the Convention in the Community legal order has
been enhanced as the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice has
developed, and with the enactment of each successive treaty. As a
consequence, fundamental rights in Community law have
become infused with the case law of the European Court of
Human Rights, and decisions of that court, which do not have
erga omnes effect, have been accorded such effect when applied
by the Court of Justice. In this way the case law of the European
Court of Human Rights, by virtue of being incorporated as part
of EU law, in principle, gains precedence over the laws and
constitutions of EU Member States, further limiting their
sovereignty.
Nevertheless, the Court of Justice has also placed limits on
the influence of the Convention on Community law, repeatedly
stressing that the nature and ambit of fundamental rights in
Community law must be determined autonomously and
according to Community aims,36 and that it may interpret
international agreements (including the Convention) according
to the Community’s objectives.37 The Court of Justice also ruled,
in Opinion 2/94,38 that accession of the EU to the Convention
would require treaty amendment, implicitly rejecting the notion
of external control by the Strasbourg machinery.
The resulting disquiet regarding the perceived danger of
divergence between the convention system and the Community
legal order with respect to fundamental rights protection, and
concern regarding the uncodified catalogue of rights in
Community law, have been addressed by the Lisbon Treaty.
35. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 6(2), 1997 O.J. C
340/145, at 151.
36. See, e.g., Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr-und Vorratsstelle
für Getreide und Futtermittel, Case 11/70, [1970] E.C.R. 1125, ¶¶ 2–4 (stating that the
protection of fundamental rights in the Community legal order “must be ensured within
the framework of the structure and objectives of the Community”).
37. See Opinion 1/91: Draft Agreement Between the Cmty., on the One Hand, and
the Countries of the Eur. Free Trade Assoc., on the Other, Relating to the Creation of
the Eur. Econ. Area, [1991] E.C.R. I-6079.
38. Opinion 2/94: Accession by the Cmty. to the Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, [1996] E.C.R. I-1759, ¶¶ 34–35.
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III. THE LISBON TREATY
The Lisbon Treaty, enacted in place of the ill-fated
Constitutional Treaty,39 amends previous treaties in order to
reform the EU’s organizational rules and expand the Union’s
competences.40 The treaty inserts a new article 6 into the
Maastricht Treaty that has the potential to transform the
fundamental rights landscape of Community law, as it greatly
enhances the status of the European Convention on Human
Rights in Community law.41
The new article 6(3) of the Maastricht Treaty, inserted by
the Lisbon Treaty, simply reiterates the old article 6(2) of that
Treaty, referred to in Part II. However, by formally providing that
fundamental rights “as guaranteed by the [Convention] and as
they result from the constitutional traditions common to the
Member States, shall constitute general principles of the Union’s
law,” the new articles 6(1) and 6(2) are of greater moment.42
Article 6(2) mandates accession of the EU to the
Convention.43 It appears beyond doubt that, once effected,
accession will render Community measures subject to some form
of review by the Strasbourg Court for the first time, even though
the precise nature of the EU’s relations with the control

39. The reforms introduced by the Lisbon Treaty were originally put forward in the
grander form of a Constitutional Treaty, signed on October 29, 2004, which was
intended to create a Constitution for the European Union to replace the existing
Treaties. See Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, 2004 O.J. C 304/1.
However, having been ratified by eighteen of the (then-twenty-five) Member States, the
Constitutional Treaty was rejected by referenda held in France and the Netherlands in
May and June 2005. The Treaty was subsequently resurrected in the somewhat humbler
form of the Lisbon Treaty, which contains all of the essential features of the
Constitutional Treaty, but amends the existing Treaties instead of replacing them. The
Lisbon Treaty entered into force on December 1, 2009, having been ratified by all
Member States. See Reform Treaty, supra note 9, art. 6(2), 2007 O.J. C 306, at 135. On
this occasion, no referendum was held in France or the Netherlands. Ireland was the
only country to hold a referendum on the Lisbon Treaty (although it may be noted that
the Constitutional Treaty had been ratified by Spain and Luxembourg following
consultative referenda).
40. Reform Treaty, supra note 9, 2007 O.J. C 306, at 1.
41. Id. art. 1(8), 2007 O.J. C 306, at 13.
42. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, art. 6(3), 2008 O.J. C
115/13, at 19 [hereinafter TEU post-Lisbon].
43. Id. art. 6(2), 2008 O.J. C 115, at 19 (“The Union shall accede to the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Such
accession shall not affect the Union’s competences as defined in the Treaties.”).
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mechanisms of the convention system under accession are as yet
undecided.44
Accession will plug a considerable lacuna in the system of
European human rights protection, whereby the laws of EU
member states have been subject to the Strasbourg Court’s
jurisdiction, while Community measures have not, thus creating
significant difficulties for member states where obligations under
Community law and the Convention have clashed. This is
illustrated most vividly by the case of Bosphorus Hava Yollari
Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v. Ireland.45 In Bosphorus, the
Strasbourg Court adopted a deferential approach to the
autonomy of the Community legal order by holding that a
presumption exists that measures taken by an EU member state
in compliance with Community law are compatible with the
Convention, rebuttable only where it has been shown that the
protection of Convention rights has been “manifestly
deficient.”46 This is not a deference the Court has shown to
contracting states to the Convention who have a highly
developed constitutional and judicial system for protecting
human rights, at least equal to that of the EU. Once the EU has
acceded to the Convention, it may be expected that the

44. See generally European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 2. The Council
of Europe has made provision for the EU’s accession to the Convention by ratifying
Protocol Fourteen to the Convention, which entered into force on July 1, 2010, and
inserts a new paragraph in article 59 of the Convention, stating: “The European Union
may accede to this Convention.” Protocol No. 14 to the Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Amending the Control System of the
Convention art. 17(1) , May 13, 2004, Europ. T.S. No. 194. However, there remain a host
of legal and practical steps that require agreement in the EU and the EU member states
in order for accession to proceed, not least questions such as how to differentiate, postaccession, between actions against the EU for violations of the Convention and actions
against member states when applying Community law. On July 7, 2010, official talks
commenced between the European Commission and the Council of Europe concerning
the European Union’s accession to the Convention.
45. Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v. Ireland, 2005-VI
Eur. Ct. H.R. 107. The clash in this case was between a European Council Regulation
imposing a trade embargo on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which implemented a
United Nations sanctions regime, and the right to property in article 1 of Protocol 1 to
the Convention. See Hon. Mr. John L. Murray, Chief Justice of Ireland, Fundamental
Rights in the European Community Legal Order, Address at the Fifty Years of European
Community Law Conference (Feb. 28–Mar. 1, 2008), in 32 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 531, 545–
47 (2009).
46. Bosphorus, 2005-VI Eur. Ct. H.R., at 158.
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Strasbourg Court will feel empowered to take a more strident
stance on the protection of Convention rights.
The new article 6(1) of the Maastricht Treaty accords legally
binding status to the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, which is
a syncretic compilation of all rights protected in Community law,
including those derived from the Convention.47 Having
previously had an ambiguous legal status since its proclamation
in 2000,48 the charter, since enactment of the Lisbon Treaty, has
“the same legal value as the Treaties.”49 The charter therefore
now provides a Bill of Rights that is legally binding on the
institutions and bodies of the European Union and on EU
member states when they are implementing Community law.
Notably, article 52(3) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights
provides that charter rights corresponding to those contained in
the Convention shall be interpreted in line with Convention
rights,50 while the preamble to the charter states that it reaffirms
rights derived from, inter alia, the case law of the European Court
of Human Rights.51
47. TEU post-Lisbon, supra note 42, art. 6, 2008 O.J. C 115, at 19. The Charter of
Fundamental Rights contains rights recognized by the treaties and in the case law of the
Court of Justice, which draws on various international instruments including the
Convention, other international conventions emanating from the Council of Europe
(e.g., the European Social Charter), as well as instruments of the United Nations and the
International Labor Organization (“ILO”). See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union, 2010 O.J. C 83/389 [hereinafter Charter of Fundamental Rights].
48. As no agreement could be reached regarding the legally binding status of the
charter, a compromise solution was solemnly proclaimed by the Presidents of the
European Parliament, the Council, and the Commission at the Nice European Council
on December 7, 2000. See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Dec.
7, 2000, 2000 O.J. C 364/1; see also Nice European Council, Presidency Conclusions, E.U.
BULL., no. 12, at 8 (2000). This led to its having an unusual legal status: it could be used
as an interpretive guide by the judicial organs of the EU and as a yardstick by which the
other organs could review legislation, but was not legally binding. See E.U. BULL., supra,
at 8 (concluding that the force of the charter will be determined at a later point in
time).
49. TEU post-Lisbon, supra note 42, art. 6(1), 2008 O.J. C 115, at 19.
50. Charter of Fundamental Rights, supra note 47, art. 52(3), 2010 O.J. C 83, at 402
(“In so far as this Charter contains rights which correspond to rights guaranteed by the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the
meaning and scope of those rights shall be the same as those laid down by the said
Convention. This provision shall not prevent Union law providing more extensive
protection.”).
51. Id. pmbl., 2010 O.J. C 83, at 391 (“This Charter reaffirms . . . the rights as they
result, in particular, from the constitutional traditions and international obligations
common to the member states . . . the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms . . . and the case-law of the Court of Justice of
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In addition, while the charter has been presented as merely
clarifying and crystallizing the catalogue of rights developed in
the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice, it contains numerous
innovations, such as the reference to the open-ended concept of
the dignity of the individual;52 provisions regarding human
cloning and biotechnology;53 and a right to marriage which does
not contain the specific reference in article 12 of the Convention
to “men and women.”54 Many of the rights are given more
extensive protection and are set out in greater detail than their
counterparts in the Convention; for example, article 21 of the
charter prohibits discrimination on fifteen grounds, almost twice
that of the corresponding article 14 of the Convention.55
It is important to note that under the EU’s accession to the
Convention, Community measures will only be subject to review
by the Strasbourg Court against the Convention, not the EU
Charter, which provides more extensive rights protection.56 Yet, it
is quite possible that the innovations in the charter will not only
influence the Court of Justice when interpreting rights in the
Community sphere, but also influence the Strasbourg Court’s
interpretation of Convention rights, which, under article 52(3) of
the charter, the Court of Justice will be bound to follow. Indeed,
in the 2002 decision of Goodwin v. United Kingdom57 the
Strasbourg Court took account of the wording of the right to

the European Communities and of the European Court of Human Rights.”) (emphasis
added).
52. Id. art. 1, 2010 O.J. C 83, at 392 (“Human dignity is inviolable. It must be
respected and protected.”).
53. Id. art. 3(2), 2010 O.J. C 83, at 392 (prohibiting “eugenic practices,” “making
the human body and its parts as such a source of financial gain,” and “reproductive
cloning of human beings” in the field of medicine and biology).
54. Id. art. 9, 2010 O.J. C 83, at 393 (“The right to marry and the right to found a
family shall be guaranteed in accordance with the national laws governing the exercise
of these rights.”).
55. Compare id. art. 21, 2010 O.J. C 83, at 393, with European Convention on
Human Rights, supra note 2, art. 14. For an analysis of the differences between the EU
Charter and the Convention, see Eve Chava Landau, A New Regime of Human Rights in the
EU, 10 EUR. J. L. REFORM 557, 564–65 (2008).
56. See Charter of Fundamental Rights, supra note 47, art. 14, 2010 O.J. C 83, at
394; see also Landau, supra note 55, at 565 (indicating that, for example, article 14 of the
charter guarantees, inter alia, a right to vocational and continuing education that is not
found in the right to education in the First Protocol to the Convention).
57. Goodwin v. United Kingdom, 2002-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 3.
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marriage in the EU Charter58 when finding that the United
Kingdom’s blanket prohibition on marriage by a transsexual
violated the applicant’s right to marry under article 12 of the
Convention.59
Taken together, the provisions of article 6 of the Lisbon
Treaty therefore significantly reduce the interpretive autonomy
of the Court of Justice of the European Communities when
construing the wide range of civil and political rights in
Community law that correspond to those in the Convention.
Prior to the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the Court
of Justice, as indicated above, enjoyed a considerable degree of
autonomy as to the meaning and scope of rights falling within
the ambit of Community law, even though it has demonstrated
considerable deference to the Strasbourg Court. The court has
been able, as Toth observes, to “enjoy the best of both worlds” by
relying on the Convention without formally being bound by it.60
However, under the fundamental rights regime introduced by
the Lisbon Treaty, the court will be more formally constrained to
follow the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human
Rights regarding rights covered by the Convention.
Thus, the Lisbon Treaty will lead to a situation where ever
more decisions of the Strasbourg Court, which do not have direct
or erga omnes effect on EU member states, will be accorded such
effect when followed by the Court of Justice in its judgments.
Accession by the EU to the Convention, rendering Community
law subject to review in Strasbourg, will also have particularly
direct effects on Community law and, by extension, on the law of
EU member states, far in excess of the current situation whereby
rulings of the Strasbourg Court have a direct impact only on the
respondent state.61 It seems inevitable that this will lead to
greater scrutiny of the decisions of the Strasbourg Court as to
58. Id. ¶ 100 (“Article 9 of the recently adopted Charter of Fundamental Rights of
the European Union departs, no doubt deliberately, from the wording of Article 12 of
the Convention in removing the reference to men and women.”).
59. Id. ¶ 103–04.
60. Advocate General Toth, The European Union and Human Rights: The Way
Forward, 34 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 491, 492 (1997).
61. This is not to say that decisions of the Strasbourg Court do not have an indirect
impact on the law of states to whom a ruling is not directly addressed; a ruling may
effectively put a state “on notice” where its law, due to its similarity to that in the
respondent state, appears to be clearly in violation of a Convention right.
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their legitimacy, having regard in particular to the interpretive
methodologies employed by that court.
IV. INTERPRETIVE METHODS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF
HUMAN RIGHTS
In the system of human rights protection provided by the
European Convention on Human Rights, recourse to the
European Court of Human Rights is a measure of last resort;
contracting states undertake to secure Convention rights within
their territory, and the court’s role is essentially supervisory and
subsidiary to that of the states.62 Accordingly, an individual must
exhaust all domestic remedies before he or she may bring a
petition before the Strasbourg Court. The Strasbourg Court
employs two key interpretive principles that reflect its supervisory
and subsidiary function: (1) the margin of appreciation doctrine;
and (2) the so-called consensus doctrine.63
A. The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine
Through the margin of appreciation doctrine, the
Strasbourg Court recognizes that, by reason of their “direct and
continuous contact with the vital forces of their countries,” the
domestic authorities in each state are, in principle, better placed
than an international court to interpret domestic law, assess the
facts of a case, or decide on the measures necessary in a
particular area, and will, depending on the circumstances, accord
a state a certain degree of latitude in balancing rights and
interests.64 However, the court has also repeatedly stated that the
margin of appreciation “goes hand in hand with European
supervision,”65 which leaves the final determination of
obligations under the Convention to the court itself.

62. European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 2, art. 35, amended by
Protocol No. 11, supra note 3, art. 1. While the convention system also allows for interstate applications to the court, the vast majority of applications to the court are made by
individuals.
63. The Court also employs a number of other interpretive principles, such as
proportionality, which are not discussed here.
64. See generally Handyside v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 22
(1976).
65. Id. at 23.
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The Strasbourg Court has held that the margin will vary
according to the nature of the Convention right in issue, its
importance for the individual, and the nature of the activities
restricted, as well as the nature of the aim pursued by the
restriction on a given right.66 In practice, this makes the margin
of appreciation a rather indeterminate standard, which is the
source of diverging views: for some, it is a necessarily imperfect
attempt to negotiate the tension between national sovereignty
and international supervision;67 for others, it is no more than an
escape clause, allowing the Court to avoid difficult sensitive,
issues which it does not wish to confront in a particular case. As
such, it is described as a doctrine so flexible that it is “as slippery
and elusive as an eel,” used by the court in place of “coherent
legal analysis” of Convention rights.68
B.

The Consensus Doctrine

Similar controversy attends the court’s use of the consensus
doctrine, which is of central importance given that it often
constitutes the primary determining factor as to whether a right
is protected by the Convention, or to what extent it is protected,
which in turn influences the margin of appreciation accorded to
a state party against whom a violation of a Convention right is
alleged. The doctrine operates on the basis that, as the
Convention is a living document requiring an evolutive
interpretation, and “the Convention is first and foremost a
system for the protection of human rights,”69 the court can
depart from its previous judgments “in order to ensure that the
interpretation of the Convention reflects societal changes and
remains in line with present-day conditions,”70 which is to be
determined by reference to the existence or otherwise of a
European consensus on the matter at issue.
66. See, e.g., Coster v. United Kingdom, App. No. 24876/94, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. 479,
506 (2001); Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 21 (1981).
67. See Ignacio de la Rasilla del Moral, The Increasingly Marginal Appreciation of the
Margin-of-Appreciation Doctrine, 7 GERMAN L.J. 611, 615 (2006).
68. Paul Mahoney, Marvellous Richness of Diversity or Invidious Cultural Relativism?, 19
HUM. RTS. L.J. 1, 5 (1998) (referring to a speech by Lord Lester to the Council of
Europe’s human rights colloquium in September 1995).
69. Chapman v. United Kingdom, 2001-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 43, 66.
70. Cossey v. United Kingdom, 184 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 14 (1990); Inze v.
Austria, 126 Eur. Ct. H.R.(ser. A) at 18 (1987).
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Ostensibly, the consensus doctrine is one of self-restraint,
keeping the scope of Convention obligations tethered to
practices in the contracting parties to the Convention. Thus, for
example, there was little surprise in 1986 when the court read
into the Convention right to property,71 an obligation on states to
provide compensation to individuals whose property is
compulsorily acquired, as it merely reflected national practice.72
In the absence of a European consensus, the court in the past has
tended to accord a wide margin of appreciation to a respondent
state, effectively applying a lowest common denominator
standard.73 The consensus doctrine has also allowed the court to
adopt a more activist approach, expanding the protection given
to a right—or, indeed, to an asserted right which was not
hitherto considered to be protected by the Convention—where it
has discerned a consensus between the contracting parties on a
given issue.74
However, the consensus doctrine in recent years has been
applied in such a way as to excessively trammel the autonomy of
the contracting states.75 This is problematic, as both the meaning
of “consensus” and the methods employed to divine its existence
have become increasingly opaque in the jurisprudence of the
Strasbourg Court. Two key difficulties arise from the Strasbourg
Court’s application of the doctrine: (1) the nature of the
consensus to be discerned is unclear: is it consensus among the
contracting parties or international consensus on a broader
scale? Must it be an established consensus, or will a mere trend
suffice?; and (2) the objective indicia used to determine the
existence or otherwise of a consensus are so varied as to leave the
court with unfettered discretion as to the sources to which it may
refer and, ultimately, the matters to which the Convention
applies.

71. Convention Protocol I, supra note 9, art. 1.
72. See James v. United Kingdom, 98 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 34 (1986).
73. See DAVID HARRIS ET AL., LAW OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS 10 (1995).
74. See infra notes 82–83 and accompanying text.
75. See infra notes 78–80 and accompanying text.
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1. The Nature of the Consensus to be Discerned
One would expect that the necessary consensus to be
determined would be that existing between the contracting
parties to the Convention. This is suggested by earlier cases
involving application of the doctrine76 and the court continues to
refer to the standard as a “European consensus.”77 However,
possibly due to the major expansion of the Council of Europe’s
membership since the collapse of the Soviet Union and a
perceived dilution of common standards, the Strasbourg Court
has, in the present decade, taken a more flexible approach to the
meaning of consensus.
This is most marked in the 2002 decision in Goodwin v.
United Kingdom,78 in which the court found that transsexuals have
the right to marry under article 12 of the Convention despite the
absence of a European consensus on the issue. While previous
applications by transsexuals alleging violation of their
Convention rights by U.K. law had foundered on the absence of a
European consensus,79 in Goodwin the court decided to attach
less importance to the absence of a consensus among the (then
forty-three) contracting parties “to the resolution of the legal and
practical problems posed, than to the clear and uncontested
evidence of a continuing international trend in favor not only of
increased social acceptance of transsexuals but of legal
recognition of the new sexual identity of post-operative
transsexuals.”80
The full significance of Goodwin is as yet unclear; the court
in that case spent little time justifying the application of the
entirely new standard applied. It is notable that since Goodwin, it
has not repeated the phrase “continuing international trend,”
76. See Handyside v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. Rep. (ser. A) at 22 (1976)
(referring to the “Contracting States”); see also Jeffrey A. Brauch, The Dangerous Search for
an Elusive Consensus: What the Supreme Court Should Learn from the European Court of
Human Rights, 52 HOWARD L.J. 277, 287 (2008).
77. See, e.g., Zaunegger v. Germany, App. No. 22028/04, 50 Eur. H.R. Rep. 952, 50
EHRR 38, [60] (Dec. 3, 2009) (as yet unpublished); Jäggi v. Switzerland, App. No.
58757/00, 47 Eur. H.R. Rep. 702, 714 (2006) (Hedigan, J., dissenting); Fretté v. France,
2002-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 347, 367.
78. Goodwin v. United Kingdom, 2002-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 1.
79. See Sheffield v. United Kingdom, 1998-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 2011; Cossey v. United
Kingdom, App. No. 10843/84, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 622 (1991); Rees v. United Kingdom,
106 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1987).
80. Goodwin, 2002-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 3, 29–30 (emphasis added).

2010]

FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AFTER LISBON

1407

articulating the standard variously as “European consensus,”81
“European and international consensus,”82 and “emerging
international consensus amongst the contracting states of the
Council of Europe.”83 However, two things are evident: the
court’s continual references to “emerging consensus”84 indicate
that trends in a particular direction will suffice as evidence of
consensus, and the court has continued, where it wishes, to place
considerable emphasis on the laws of non-contracting states.
For example, in Hirst v. United Kingdom (No.2)85 in 2005, the
court found the United Kingdom’s blanket denial of voting rights
to prisoners a violation of the Convention right to vote86 despite
the absence of any “common European approach” to the issue.87
This prompted a dissenting opinion from five Judges decrying
the majority judgment’s extensive reference to two recent
judgments of the Supreme Court of Canada and the
Constitutional Court of South Africa but which, they noted,
“unfortunately contains only summary information concerning
the legislation on prisoners’ right to vote in the Contracting
States.”88 The court has also placed great emphasis on the laws of
states who are not party to the Convention in other cases.89

81. See cases cited supra note 77.
82. Grant v. United Kingdom, 2006-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 9 (concerning a similar
factual scenario to Goodwin).
83. E.g., Muñoz-Díaz v. Spain, App. No. 49151/07, 50 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1244, 1262
(2009); D.H. v. Czech Republic, App. No. 57325/00, 47 Eur. H.R. Rep. 59, 118 (2007).
The court seems to have been reiterating statements in pre-Goodwin decisions
concerning nomadic minorities. See, e.g., Smith v. United Kingdom, App. No. 25154/94,
33 Eur. H.R. Rep. 712, 740 (2001); Lee v. United Kingdom, App. No. 25289/94, 33 Eur.
H.R. Rep. 677, 702 (2001); Coster v. United Kingdom, 33 Eur. Ct. H.R. 479, 506 (2001);
Beard v. United Kingdom, App. No. 24882/94, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. 442, 470 (2001).
84. See, e.g., Weller v. Hungary, App. No. 44399/05 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Mar. 31, 2009)
(unpublished); Ünal Tekeli v. Turkey, 2004-X Eur. Ct. H.R. 213, 254; Chapman v.
United Kingdom, 2001-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 43, 29–30 (2001).
85. Hirst v. United Kingdom (No. 2), 2005-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 187.
86. See Convention Protocol 1, supra note 9, art. 3.
87. Hirst (No. 2), 2005-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. at 206.
88. Id. at 230 (Wildhaber, J., Costa, J., Lorenzen, J., Kovler, J., & Jebens, J.,
dissenting).
89. See, e.g., Appleby v. United Kingdom, 2003-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 189, 194–200 (2003)
(noting, on the basis of an extensive analysis of American and Canadian law, an
“interesting trend” towards accommodating freedom of expression on private property
open to the public).
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2. The Court’s Use of Objective Indicia
The Goodwin90 and Hirst91 judgments are prominent
examples of the Strasbourg Court’s loose approach to the
identification of indicia pointing towards consensus. To date, the
court has not delimited the range of sources to which it may refer
when determining whether a consensus, or emerging consensus,
exists.
In its case law the Strasbourg Court refers to a wide range of
sources: national constitutions of the contracting states; domestic
legislation; international agreements to which not all contracting
states are parties; the law of non-contracting parties; and,
increasingly, documents produced by bodies that have no
discernible democratic mandate, such as the Committee of
Experts
on
the
Application
of
Conventions
and
Recommendations92 and the Council of Europe’s Commission on
Democracy through Law.93
Goodwin once again provides a useful example. In that case,
as noted above, the court referred to a “continuing international
trend” in favor of legal recognition of transsexuals’ postoperative
gender, citing Australian and New Zealand authorities, the EU
Charter of Fundamental Rights, to which only twenty-seven out of
the forty-seven contracting states to the Convention are parties,
as well as citing provisions of the U.K. tax code.94
90. Goodwin v. United Kingdom, 2002-VI Eur.Ct. H.R. 1.
91. Hirst (No. 2), 2005-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 187.
92. The Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and
Recommendations (“CEACR”) is a body composed of twenty members, tasked with
examining government reports on the application of ILO conventions and assessing the
conformity of national law and practice with ILO conventions. The Strasbourg Court has
referred to documents of the CEACR in numerous cases. See, e.g., Rainys v. Lithuania,
App. Nos. 70665 & 74345/01, ¶ 30 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Apr. 7, 2005) (unpublished).
93. The Council of Europe’s Commission on Democracy through Law (the “Venice
Commission”) is the Council of Europe’s advisory body on constitutional matters, which
operates as a pan-European legal “think tank.” The court in Menchinskaya v. Russia held
that “it has often used for the purpose of interpreting the scope of the rights and
freedoms guaranteed by the Convention intrinsically non-binding instruments of
Council of Europe organs to support its reasoning by reference to norms emanating
from these organs.” App. No. 42454/02, ¶ 34 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Jan. 15, 2009)
(unpublished). In Menchinskaya, the court relied heavily on an opinion of the Venice
Commission as to whether the Prosecutor’s Office in Russia is compatible with the
Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly Resolution 1604 (2003) concerning the
role of the public prosecutor’s office in a democratic society. See id. ¶ 34.
94. Goodwin, 2002-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 18.
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Of even greater concern is where the court has broken new
ground without expressly stating the basis for its finding of a new
consensus. For example, in Taxquet v. Belgium,95 decided in
January 2009, the court ruled that the lack of a requirement for
juries to adequately explain the basis for their verdicts was a
violation of article 6 of the Convention.96 This was an apparent
departure from previous decisions in which it had found that the
lack of reasoned verdicts did not constitute a violation of the
Convention where adequate procedural safeguards existed.97 The
court stated:
Not having been given so much as a summary of the main
reasons why the Assize Court was satisfied that he was guilty,
[the applicant] was unable to understand—and therefore to
accept—the court’s decision. . . . It is therefore important,
for the purpose of explaining the verdict both to the accused
and to the public at large—the “people” in whose name the
decision is given—to highlight the considerations that have
persuaded the jury of the accused’s guilt or innocence and to
indicate the precise reasons why each of the questions has
been answered in the affirmative or the negative.98

The Belgian government has now appealed the Taxquet decision
to the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights
for final judgment, which is due in 2010.99
In the meantime, the meaning of the Taxquet judgment is
not entirely clear, but it appears to indicate that juries in all
contracting parties to the Convention will have to provide a
reasoned basis for their verdicts.100 This would, of course, have
profound implications for juries across Europe, not least the Irish
95. Taxquet v. Belgium, App. No. 926/05 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Jan. 13, 2009)
(unpublished).
96. Id. ¶ 50.
97. In the cases of R v. Belgium, App. No. 15957/90, 72 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. &
Rep. 195 (1992), Zarouali v. Belgium, App. No. 20664/92, 78-A Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec.
& Rep. 97 (1994), and Papon v. France (No. 2), 2001-XII Eur. H.R. Rep. 235, the
European Court of Human Rights had found that the procedure in France and
Belgium, whereby the trial judge issues questions to the jury regarding the defendant’s
guilt, provided a sufficiently reasoned framework for the jury’s decision where the
questions were specific and precisely formulated.
98. Taxquet, ¶ 48.
99. A hearing of the Grand Chamber took place on October 21, 2009, and the
Registry of the European Court of Human Rights has indicated that the Grand
Chamber’s final judgment should be issued at some point in 2010.
100. Taxquet, ¶ 40.
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jury system, in which the secrecy of jury deliberations is
sacrosanct under constitutional law and would appear to
preclude the provision of formally reasoned verdicts.101
Ironically, given the subject matter of its decision, the
court’s finding of consensus is left unexplained in the judgment,
with the court justifying its new position in one brief paragraph:
[S]ince the Zarouali case there has been a perceptible change in
both the Court’s case-law and the Contracting States’
legislation. In its case-law the Court has frequently held that
the reasoning provided in court decisions is closely linked to
the concern to ensure a fair trial as it allows the rights of the
defence to be preserved. Such reasoning is essential to the
very quality of justice and provides a safeguard against
arbitrariness. Thus, certain States, such as France, have made
provision for the right of appeal in assize court proceedings and for
the publication of a statement of reasons in assize court decisions.102

The general opacity of the court’s reasoning and its failure
to provide any explanation as to what this “perceptible” change
in the case law is or any detail as to a substantial consensus in law
or practice between the member states is, in itself, disturbing.
This dubious rationale is highlighted by the French government’s
observation in its third party submission to the Grand Chamber
that the Strasbourg Court’s reference to legal developments in
France is not based on any law in force, but on a 1996 Bill that
was never enacted.103 The fact that this is the sole explicit and
concrete reference to legal developments in any of the
contracting parties to the Convention, implicitly alluding to an
evolving consensus, leaves the justification for the Taxquet
decision precarious indeed. It also calls into question the socalled “consensus” approach and, in particular, recourse to the
notion of “emerging trends.”
In any event, had the court engaged in a more extensive
comparative analysis, this would simply have revealed that no
consensus exists in Europe as to the provision of reasoned
verdicts by juries; rather, the opposite is true. While reasoned

101. It has been said that a jury’s deliberations “should always be regarded as
completely confidential” and “should not be published after a trial.” O’Callaghan v.
Attorney General, [1993] 2 I.R 17, 26.
102. Taxquet, ¶ 43 (emphasis added).
103. See Third Party Observations of the Government of France, Taxquet, at 4.
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verdicts are provided by some mixed courts in Europe where
jurors sit with professional judges (e.g., Denmark and Germany),
in other mixed courts (e.g., France) no reasons are provided.
Among the various contracting parties with juries composed
entirely of lay persons who deliberate without any judicial
assistance (e.g., Belgium, Ireland, Spain, United Kingdom), the
provision of reasons is non-existent or extremely rare, Spain
being the only exception.104 Some countries, such as Belgium, do
permit detailed questions to be put to the jury, the answers to
which may disclose the underlying rationale for its verdict. All
this is a far cry from a European consensus.
It is little surprise, then, that the respondent government,
Belgium, and the governments of France, Ireland, and the
United Kingdom, in third party submissions, have strongly
criticized the Taxquet judgment.105 Stressing the long pedigree of
their respective jury systems and the profound implications of a
requirement for reasoned verdicts, the governments take the
Strasbourg Court to task for failing to respect the diversity in
modes of jury trial across Europe, and stress that the court’s role
is to maintain minimum standards of rights protection across
Europe, not, as the Belgian government puts it, “to favour a
particular concept of (criminal) justice and thereby to favour, or
even impose, a particular conception of the legitimacy of
criminal proceedings.”106 “It is not for [the Court in
Strasbourg],” the government states, “to pronounce in the
abstract on [jury systems in Europe] or to harmonise the various
systems . . . .”107

104. See, e.g., Ethan J. Leib, A Comparison of Criminal Jury Decision Rules in Democratic
Countries, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 629, 635 (2008); see also Norsk Retstidende [Rt]
[Supreme Court] 2009 p. 750 (Nor.) (criminal appeal of Arfan Qadeer Bhatti
concerning a challenge to a jury verdict based on the decision in Taxquet v. Belgium). An
official English translation of the Bhatti appeal is available on the Norwegian Supreme
Court’s website at http://www.domstol.no/upload/hret/bhatti-anonymisert-engelsk.pdf.
105. See e.g., Third Party Observations of the Government of France, Taxquet;
Observations of the Government of Belgium, Taxquet.
106. See Observations of the Government of Belgium, Taxquet, at 12.
107. See id. at 15.
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V. CONSENSUS AND LEGITIMACY
A. The Legitimacy of Consensus in the Convention System
The case law briefly analyzed above is indicative of the
elasticity and indeterminacy of the consensus doctrine as
employed by the Strasbourg Court, and tends to lend weight to
the view expressed by various commentators that the doctrine is a
“moving target,” used to “rationalize policy judgments rather
than to reach decisions under a clear legal framework,”108 or is a
“convenient subterfuge for implementing the court’s hidden
principled decisions.”109
On one level, disputes as to the use of the consensus
doctrine by the Strasbourg Court in the international setting
simply mirror those on the national stage. The U.S. Supreme
Court, for example, has witnessed considerable controversy in
cases such as Atkins v. Virginia110 and Roper v. Simmons111 as to
both the role of consensus in determining whether the death
penalty in different circumstances constitutes a cruel and
unusual punishment in the light of evolving standards of
decency, and the means of determining consensus. The U.S. case
law evinces polar views as to how long-established a consensus
must be, the indicia to which the Court may refer, and the
legitimacy of applying the Court’s independent judgment
alongside the determination of consensus. For Justice Scalia, who
has written key dissents to recent Eighth Amendment decisions,
consensus must be overwhelming and long-established to justify
departure from precedent;112 applying the Court’s own judgment
to such consensus is to “replace judges with a committee of
philosopher-kings.”113 He believes that referring to sociological
studies and the law of other nations which support the majority’s
principled decision is merely “to look over the heads of the
crowd and pick out its friends.”114

108. Brauch, supra note 76, at 287, 291.
109. Eyal Benvenisti, Margin of Appreciation, Consensus and International Standards,
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 843, 851 (1999).
110. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
111. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
112. See, e.g., Atkins, 536 U.S. 304.
113. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 379 (1989).
114. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 617 (2005).
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Whatever may be said concerning certain methods of
interpretation of the U.S. Constitution, Justice Scalia’s concerns
take on added meaning when applied to the Convention system.
After all, the U.S. Supreme Court ultimately operates in a
national setting containing one demos (however heterogeneous its
population may be) and is tasked with interpreting a federal
constitution which has inherent primacy throughout the United
States.115
By contrast, the Strasbourg Court operates in the
international context, interpreting an international instrument
to which forty-seven sovereign states are parties, each containing
its own demos and its own historical, social, and political
particularities.116 Interpretation of the Convention is subject to
the presumption that the states do not intend to surrender their
sovereignty except to the extent made clear in the instrument
itself. Yet the Convention, like all bills of rights, only offers so
much guidance, and is replete with open-ended concepts such as
“the right to respect for private and family life.”117
Within the bounds of the nation state, a court faced with the
interpretation of fundamental rights at least has the advantage of
operating within a single societal context to which it is directly
linked, and clear reference points such as a written Constitution,
a legislating parliament and government. Lacking such clear
reference points, the Strasbourg Court’s reliance on extra-textual
doctrines such as the margin of appreciation and consensus is
understandable, but this nevertheless poses difficult questions of
legitimacy in its interpretation of an international instrument
applicable to sovereign states.
Defining the scope and content of fundamental rights
cannot proceed on the basis of a mere head count. Law, after all,
is to some extent a search for moral truth, and resort to a
consensus doctrine as a method of interpreting the Convention
cannot replace the search for the objective moral content of
human rights referred to in the text of the Convention;

115. See John L. Murray, Consensus: Concordance, or Hegemony of the Majority?
(Jan. 25, 2008), in Eur. Court of Human Rights, Dialogue Between Judges 2008, at 25, 34
(Nov. 2008), available at http://www.echr.coe.int/nr/rdonlyres/d6da05da-8b1d-41c6bc38-36ca6f864e6a/0/dialogue_between_judges_2008.pdf.
116. See id.
117. European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 2, art. 8.
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otherwise, the Strasbourg Court would abdicate its judicial role as
interpreter. The Strasbourg Court’s ambivalent attitude toward
consensus, since the very inception of the doctrine,118 and the
fact that its decisions are often ultimately based on substantive
consideration of the Convention right in question, rather than
simply on the existence of some kind of consensus, appears in
some way to reflect this concern.
The court clearly does not take a consistent or mechanistic
approach to the application of the consensus doctrine: in some
cases consensus, or absence of consensus, is presented as
determinative of the issue; in others it is used to merely bolster a
normative analysis of the Convention right at issue; in yet others
absence of consensus has been dismissed as not being
determinative of the issue.
Of course, the court has made general observations to the
effect that where no consensus exists between the contracting
parties, “particularly where the case raises sensitive moral or
ethical issues,” the margin of appreciation accorded to a
respondent state will be wider.119 Yet it is difficult to reconcile
decisions such as Evans v. United Kingdom120 and Vo v. France,121 in
which the court held that, due to the absence of consensus, the
question of the beginning of life and the use of embryos came
within the margin of appreciation of the state concerned, with
the decision in Goodwin, in which the absence of consensus did
not produce the same result as regards the right of transsexuals
to marry,122 another matter of ethical and social sensitivity.
It must be recognized that the European Court of Human
Rights operates in a difficult institutional setting: it is, as many
have observed, at once both an international court operating
within the bounds of international law, yet it is endowed with at
118. In Tyrer v. United Kingdom the court, in finding that the corporal punishment
of “birching” used in the Isle of Man constituted a “degrading punishment” contrary to
article 3 of the Convention, noted that it could not “be influenced by the developments
and commonly accepted standards in the penal policy of the member states of the
Council of Europe in this field.” 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 15 (1978). Yet, the decision
fundamentally rests on the court’s assessment of the intrinsic nature of the punishment
at issue, and its objective view of the protection afforded by article 3 of the Convention.
119. Evans v. United Kingdom, App. No. 6339/05, 46 Eur. H.R. Rep. 728, 752
(2006).
120. Id.
121. Vo v. France, 2004-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 84.
122. Goodwin v. United Kingdom, 2002-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 18.
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least some of the characteristics of a constitutional court.123 It
must maintain minimum human rights standards across Europe
yet allow the Convention to reflect developments in
understanding and knowledge of issues that pertain to
fundamental rights, while accommodating the great diversity in
the legal traditions, societies, and cultures of the contracting
parties. As Professor Janneke Gerards has recently put it, the
court must navigate “between the Scylla of providing too little
protection to individual rights and the Charybdis of pronouncing
judgments that are not compatible with fundamental views and
legal or institutional constructs existing in a certain state.”124
However, Professor Gerards notes that while this promotes a
pragmatic and flexible approach to adjudication by the court, its
use of interpretive principles is rather too lax, providing neither
consistency nor predictability:
Seemingly without good reason, the Court sometimes adopts
an attitude of reserve, waiting for a natural convergence of
national case law to occur, while in other cases it is far more
activist and may force new and progressive definitions and
methods upon the states. Thus, there is a considerable risk of
the Court becoming entangled in its own ambiguous and
inconsistent case law, without there being any directing
principles that may help it to untie the knots.125

Even if the court was to apply the consensus doctrine in a
consistent fashion, the very use of consensus as a tool for rights
adjudication is contested: it may be characterized as an
undesirable renvoi to national systems, whose human rights
protection may be lacking, or praised as a means of respecting
the diversity among the contracting parties to the Convention.
Such praise, of course, could only be valid if the court confined
itself to finding a true consensus and then respected any existing
diversity among the contracting states.
Applied too loosely, as it has been in recent years, in cases
such as Goodwin and Taxquet, discussed above,126 the consensus
123. See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Human Rights, International Economic Law and
“Constitutional Justice,” 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 769, 777–78 (2008).
124. Janneke Gerards, Judicial Deliberations in the European Court of Human Rights, in
THE LEGITIMACY OF HIGHEST COURTS’ RULINGS: JUDICIAL DELIBERATIONS AND BEYOND
407, 418 (Nick Huls et al. eds., 2009).
125. Id. at 435.
126. See discussion supra notes 78–80, 95–112.
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doctrine degenerates into an interpretive tool of such
indeterminacy as to permit the court to exercise a freewheeling
discretion in the interpretation of Convention rights, raising the
specter of the convention system operating as a Richterstaat or
“Judge’s Empire,” as Dworkin puts it,127 or a “committee of
philosopher-kings,” to use Justice Scalia’s colorful phrase.
Yet, when applied strictly, employment of the consensus
doctrine can divest the Convention of its central purpose by
eschewing objective scrutiny of state practices that risk violating
individual rights, simply due to their prevalence. An example
would be Klass v. Germany,128 in which German antiterrorism laws
permitting extensive phone tapping and interception of
communications were upheld due to a perceived trend toward
the use of such surveillance methods among the contracting
parties. More importantly, it avoids objective interpretation of the
text of the Convention by simply concocting an answer to a
matter before the court by reference to the existence of
consensus. This has proved, for some, all the more worrying
when the “consensus” relied on by the court cannot legitimately
be considered a meaningful consensus as such.
That is to say, even where the “consensus” relied upon by
the Strasbourg Court as a basis for its decisions is clearly derived
from a majority of legislation in a majority of the contracting
states, this amounts to little more than the imposition of the
majority view. The very word “consensus” implies more than this,
a unanimity of sorts, meaning that majority consensus (however
discerned) is ultimately oxymoronic. This hegemony of the
majority is of particular concern where a state has, through the
democratic process and national discourse, come to a carefully
calibrated compromise on a difficult social, ethical, or moral
issue.
Is it for an international court to negate the difficult choices
made at the national level simply on the basis that a “majority
consensus” exists? As Richard Posner has observed: “To equate
truth to consensus would imply that the earth was once
flat . . . .”129 Indeed, as another American author has observed:
“Historically, the claim of consensus has been the first refuge of
127. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 399 (1986).
128. Klass v. Germany, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 12–13 (1978).
129. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 113 (1990).
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the scoundrel: it is a way to avoid debate by claiming that the
matter is already settled.”130 On the other hand, Posner
recognizes that consensus, particularly intergenerational
consensus, is a commonly used reference point in the search for
moral truth, stating “[m]uch of our stock of common and
elementary moral beliefs is validated [by consensus] and no
other way [and that] the longer a widespread belief persists,
surviving changes in outlook and culture and advances in
knowledge, the likelier it is to be correct.”131
This raises the question as to whether the invocation of
international trends or “emerging” consensus as a basis for
construing Convention rights is entirely legitimate. In its
selection of sources upon which consensus may be based, is the
Strasbourg Court simply looking over the heads of the crowd and
picking out its friends? Is it enough to make decisions on the
basis of legislation or other indicia such as the reports of
international bodies which are, by their very nature, reflective of
merely local compromises or of current attitudes and
perceptions?
The importance of such questions as to the legitimacy of the
consensus doctrine has intensified in the current era due to the
increasing influence of the convention system on domestic legal
orders. The contracting parties, by establishing the full-time
court as the sole judicial organ of the convention system in 1998,
have significantly enhanced the court’s power, leaving it in a
position to adjudicate on “virtually every major constitutional
controversy involving rights that arises in the Contracting
Parties.”132 States have given effect to a greater or lesser degree to
the Convention in their domestic legal orders: for those with
monist systems, the Convention has been given full effect in
domestic law and takes precedence over national legislation or
even the national constitution; in states with dualist systems, such

130. Michael Crichton, Caltech Michelin Lecture: Aliens Cause Global Warming
(Jan. 17, 2003) (transcript available at http://www.cfa.harvard.edu/~scranmer/SPD/
crichton.html).
131. POSNER, supra note 129, at 112.
132. Alec Stone Sweet, On the Constitutionalisation of the Convention: The European
Court of Human Rights as a Constitutional Court, 80 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DES DROITS DE
L’HOMME 923 (2009).
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as Ireland and the United Kingdom, the Convention has been
given more limited, interpretive effect.133
The court has also enhanced its own role vis-à-vis the
contracting states and accreted considerable influence, through
“constitutionalization” of the Convention as an “instrument of
European public order (ordre public)”134 and, in particular, by
beginning to deliver so-called “pilot” judgments which require
specific measures to remedy systemic deficiencies in states
causing multiple violations of the Convention, rather than merely
providing redress to individual applicants.135 Judge Christos
Rozakis, vice president of the court, has referred to the court’s
role as one of “‘integration,’ in the sense that, through its
decisions and judgments, it is attempting to create a coherent
body of human rights rules that apply equally and
indiscriminately in the sphere of the legal relations of all of the
States party to the Convention.”136
Talk of “‘integration” suggests that the Strasbourg Court’s
role is similar to that of the European Union’s Court of Justice: to
harmonize the legal systems of the member states. However, the
Court of Justice’s harmonizing function is expressly provided for
in the text of Community treaties and necessary due to the stated
objectives of the European Union, which is to lay the foundations
of an ever closer political union among the peoples of Europe
within a constitutional framework based on an autonomous and
holistic legal order.
By contrast, there is no substantive textual basis in the
Convention ascribing such a role to the Strasbourg Court.
Indeed, as Stone Sweet has observed, the founding states never
came to full agreement as to whether the Convention simply set a
minimum level of protection of basic rights or established “a
legal foundation for a more expansive evolution of rights.”137 In
133. For example, in Ireland, the convention has been given greater effect at a subconstitutional level: by statute, domestic legislation must be interpreted, “in so far as is
possible,” in accordance with the Convention, subject to the constitution and
constitutional principles. European Convention on Human Rights Act, 2003 (Act No.
20/2003), § 2(1), available at http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/2003/en/act/pub/0020/
index.html.
134. See Loizidou v. Turkey, 1998-IV Eur. Ct. H. R. 1807, 1820–21.
135. See Broniowski v. Poland, 2004-V Eur. Ct. H. R. 1.
136. Judge Christos Rozakis, The European Judge as Comparatist, 80 TULANE L. REV.
257, 272 (2005).
137. Sweet, supra note 132, at 2.
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Stone Sweet’s view, the contracting parties, in strengthening the
judicial machinery of the Convention system over time, “have
transferred authority to ‘complete’ or ‘construct’ Convention
rights, rendering them more determinate over time for all
members, despite national diversity.”138
However, while states have certainly accepted the court’s
view that the Convention is a “living instrument” which must be
subject to an evolutive interpretation,139 the context in which the
Strasbourg Court operates means that self-restraint is
appropriate, particularly with respect to matters of a sensitive
moral or ethical nature at a national level. Consensus, if it is to be
invoked, should at least have the attributes identified by Posner
of
being
intergenerational,
long-established,
and
overwhelming,140 and the Strasbourg Court should be loath to
adopt a harmonizing approach where such consensus does not
exist.
Yet, such self-restraint appears to be lacking in many recent
judgments of the court, discussed above.141 The legitimacy of
imposing a uniform standard is particularly questionable where a
case before the court involves the balancing of rights rather than
a straightforward violation of one right; for example, the court’s
case law developing a stronger right to privacy on the basis of
article 8 of the Convention has been criticized as imposing an
undesirable uniform standard given that a great variety of
solutions have been found in the contracting states to the conflict
between freedom of the press and the privacy of individuals.142
Ultimately, the court’s evolutive role is to mirror change, not
to act as a catalyst for change or impose a uniform standard of
rights across Europe. There are undoubtedly core and
fundamental rights, such as the right to life and to liberty for
example, which derive from a common European heritage and
require a universal level of protection.143 Beyond this, is it the
138. Id. at 3.
139. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
140. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
141. See supra notes 75, 78–80, 85, 88–91 and accompanying text.
142. See Dieter Grimm, Freedom of Speech in a Globalized World, in EXTREME SPEECH
AND DEMOCRACY 20 (Ivan Hare & James Weinstein eds., 2009).
143. Cf. Ingolf Pernice, The Treaty of Lisbon: Multilevel Constitutionalism in Action, 15
COLUM. J. EUR. L. 349, 384 (2009) (“[C]ourts at the national and the European level
share a responsibility to ensure the proper functioning of the Union, equal and effective
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court’s role under the Convention to impose standards based on
questionable consensus or emerging trends reflected in, for
example, national legislation, which often reflect compromises of
political policy on a national level, accompanied by caveats,
exceptions, or limitations, which over time may be amended or
qualified, or even abandoned?
Why should contracting states have imposed on them law or
principles not deriving from the text of the Convention, but
stemming from decisions at legislative levels in, at best, a majority
of contracting states? For the court to develop its jurisprudence
on such foundations is a denial of the presumption in favor of
the sovereignty of the contracting parties and of the diversity that
an instrument such as the European Convention on Human
Rights is meant to respect. As the French government has stated
in its third party observations to the Grand Chamber in the case
of Taxquet v. Belgium, even if some states have changed their
legislation to require reasoned verdicts from juries, it is for each
state to decide “whether or not to join this trend.”144 One cannot
but agree with the statement that the court should exercise
“extreme caution” in departing from its own precedent,145 and
that “the authority of the Court’s decisions is indisputably
weakened” where it develops its jurisprudence on the basis of an
inadequate analysis such as that in Taxquet.146
B.

Importing Strasbourg’s Consensus into Community Law

These difficulties are amplified when Strasbourg case law is
applied in the context of Community law. The Strasbourg
Court’s approach is in marked contrast to that of the European
Court of Justice, which traditionally confined itself to the
constitutions of its member states, and the international
conventions to which they have subscribed, when it seeks
inspiration from general principles of law as to the existence and
content of fundamental rights in Community law. Those sources,
particularly national constitutions, as opposed to national
application of the law throughout the Union, and the full respect of the basic principles
common to the Union and its Member States—including the fundamental rights and
liberties of the individual.”).
144. Observations of the Government of France, Taxquet v. Belgium, at 7.
145. Id. at 6.
146. Id. at 6.
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legislation, are more reliable indicators of consensus, and wellestablished consensus at that. However, under the new
fundamental rights regime introduced by the Lisbon Treaty, the
much more lax approach of the Strasbourg Court will influence
Community law to a far greater extent than was previously the
case.
One of the main difficulties, even if one were to accept the
use of the consensus doctrine in principle, is that a finding of
consensus by the Strasbourg Court may easily not reflect a
consensus among EU member states. A so-called substantial
consensus, let alone “emerging trends,” among the forty-seven
contracting parties to the Convention does not necessarily mean
that any consensus exists between the EU twenty-seven.
Consensus in its most flexible form, a “continuing international
trend” that could be based on the laws and practices of any
selection of states, including non-contracting parties to the
Convention, is meaningless when transplanted to the context of
Community law.
Yet, the Court of Justice under Lisbon will be bound to
follow questionable consensus-based judgments emanating from
the Strasbourg Court in its own case law, with the result that the
scope and nature of fundamental rights in Community law will be
determined according to the practices of states which are not,
and most of which will never be, member states of the EU. Given
the binding erga omnes nature of the judgments of the Court of
Justice on EU member states, the door is therefore open to a far
greater penetration of domestic legal orders by the case law of
the Strasbourg Court, and far less discretion is left to national
courts and legislatures as to the nature and scope of fundamental
rights. The values inscribed in national constitutions will become
less and less relevant.
Thus henceforth, as some perceive it, the great issues of
human rights will be decided for the European Union,
ultimately, not by reference to the constitutions of the member
states, nor by a court in a union of twenty-seven member states,
but by an international court, the European Court of Human
Rights, whose reference point is a Convention applicable in fortyseven member states, that is to say, by an institution which refers
to the perspectives of many states outside the European Union
and has recourse to sources of law which are detached, and even
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remote, to the constitutions of EU member states or treaties to
which they are signatories.
CONCLUSION
This Article has presented perhaps a harsh view of the
interpretive methods of the Strasbourg Court, and a pessimistic
view of the impact of the Lisbon Treaty on Community law.
However, the implications of the Lisbon Treaty for the future
development of fundamental rights in Community law raises
many difficult questions. The erosion or elimination of a state’s
capacity to act, particularly regarding issues on which difficult
compromises must be made, on the basis of a consensus doctrine
that is inherently flawed, threatens to shake the integrity and
authority of the Strasbourg Court should it seek to strengthen its
harmonizing role. Worse, through the Court of Justice’s loss of
interpretive autonomy under the Lisbon Treaty, the question
mark that hovers over the legitimacy of the Strasbourg Court’s
interpretative methods may yet appear over the fundamental
rights jurisprudence of the Court of Justice. This would be a
highly undesirable development for fundamental rights in
Community law, and by extension, for the law of EU member
states that are all subject to the decisions of the Court of Justice.

